



Notes – Chapter 13

Investment Centers and Transfer Pricing

- I. Investment Centers
 - a. The highest level of authority that someone can have in a business.
 - b. Evolution of management control systems within a firm over time
 - i. (There's no necessary path, but this is an example)
 - ii. Nothing formal at first
 - iii. Formal accounting system established
 - iv. Rudimentary Budgets employed
 1. Develops from a need for some kind of control device
 2. Usually static budgeting at first
 - v. Standard Costing and Flexible Budgets introduced
 - vi. Decentralization
 1. Geographical diversification
 2. Small-size accounting just doesn't work
 3. Delegation of management
 4. Push some authority lower down the hierarchy
 5. Advantages
 - a. Better response time
 - b. Those with greatest task-specific knowledge are making the decisions related to the task.
 - c. It's just plain impractical to micro-manage a giant firm
 6. The Rub
 - a. How can goal congruence be maintained?
 - b. If everyone is making independent decisions, how can everyone be working toward the same goals?
 - vii. Establish formal responsibility accounting centers
- II. Some History
 - a. El du Pont de Nemours
 - b. Established in 1802 to make black powder
 - c. Stats
 - i. Revenue is currently \$30 billion
 - ii. Net Income approximately \$10 billion
 - iii. About 100 thousand employees
 - iv. One hundred thirty-five plants in 70 countries.
 - d. Now makes Teflon, Kevlar, etc
 - e. In about 1903, the company was on the verge of collapse due to heavy competition
 - f. Decided new management technique was necessary for survival.
 - g. Cousins Alfred, Coleman, Pierre
 - i. Established a new firm; gave stock and bonds to the family
 - ii. Began to diversify into other chemicals
 - iii. Began to vertically integrate with the suppliers and distributors
 - h. Had previously been responsible only for managing a manufacturing firm; now had much more to oversee.
 - i. This was the first example of the evolution of responsibility centers
 - j. F. Donaldson Brown
 - i. Want to know how efficient a firm is at using its invested capital and how profitable it is.
 - ii. Developed the concept of return on investment
 - iii. $(\text{Income} / \text{Sales}) * (\text{Sales} / \text{Invested Capital})$
 - iv. Addresses both of those questions.
 - v. $\text{ROI} = (\text{Income} / \text{Invested Capital})$
 - vi. "The Du Pont Formula"

- III. Measuring Performance in Investment Centers
 - a. Three different approaches
 - b. Return on Investment
 - i. $ROI = \text{Income} / \text{Invested Capital}$
 - ii. Back to Du Point
 - iii. To improve ROI, can do two things
 - 1. Improve sales margin (What can be done to reduce variable costs?)
 - 2. Improve capital turnover
 - a. Could increase sales revenue
 - b. More importantly, could decrease investment
 - c. Find equipment that will yield more output for less input
 - d. If you can avoid making the investment yourself, do so (find a supplier who's already done it)
 - e. Take "Off Balance Sheet" opportunities
 - f. Variabilize the cost
 - g. Investment levels affected by Accounts Payable, Inventory, current assets, etc.
 - iv. By far the most common measure used in relation to investment centers
 - v. The Rub
 - 1. Suppose the company's ROI is 20%, the Division is at 25%
 - 2. An opportunity arises with ROI = 22%
 - 3. The division probably wouldn't take the opportunity because it hurts the personal perspective
 - 4. It definitely *should* take the opportunity since it would benefit the whole company
 - 5. ROI also doesn't consider the cost of capital
 - c. Residual Income
 - i. $RI = \text{Investment Center Profit} - \text{Investment Charge}$
 - ii. $\text{Investment Charge} = \text{Capital} * \text{Imputed Interest Rate}$
 - iii. Imputed Interest Rate is the investment center's minimum required rate of return
 - 1. Hurdle Rate
 - 2. Talking about ROI
 - iv. If residual income is positive, take the investment
 - v. The Rub
 - 1. RI deals with absolute figures, so a bigger investment always looks more attractive than a smaller investment, even when the smaller may be more profitable in the ROI sense.
 - 2. Can't compare divisions of different sizes using strictly ROI.
 - d. Economic Value Added
 - i. Other methods don't reflect the entire cost of capital.
 - ii. Should include both debt and equity.
 - iii. Equity can be even more expensive than debt.
 - iv. Calculation
 - 1. $EVA = \text{Net Operating Profit After Tax} - \text{Cost of Debt} - \text{Cost of Capital}$.
 - 2. $NOPAT - \text{Investment Charge}$
 - 3. $\text{Investment Charge} = (\text{Total Assets} - \text{Current Liabilities}) * (\text{Weighted Average Cost of Capital})$
 - 4. $\text{Weighted Average Cost of Capital} = ((\text{After Tax Cost of Debt} * \text{Market Value of Debt}) + (\text{Cost of Equity} * \text{Market Value of Equity})) / (\text{Market Value of Debt} + \text{Market Value of Equity})$
 - v. Cost of Equity is the return to be expected from a company with a similar risk configuration (a percentage – will always be given in problems)
 - vi. Want a positive EVA measure.
 - vii. Positive EVA means that money is being made above the cost of *all* capital.

- e. The Rub
 - i. All investment center measures can be too short-term (myopic) in focus.
 - ii. Investments themselves are almost always long-term.
 - iii. Cannot ever pick a single method exclusively or you'll always incorporate some error.
 - iv. Follow up on investments with auditing.
 - v. Hold accountable whatever individuals made incorrect promises about some investment
- IV. Calculating Investment Capital
 - a. ROI, RI, and EVA are all measured over time.
 - b. Asset balances are taken at some point in time.
 - c. Usually just average the change in assets to get the value for the period.
 - d. But what's the total? Total productive assets? Total assets less current liabilities?
 - e. It depends on the particular situation at a company
 - f. Gross Book Value or Net Book Value
 - i. Net = Acquisition Cost less Accumulated Depreciation
 - g. Advantages to using Net Book Value
 - i. This is what's reflected on the balance sheet, so it lends consistency in that regard.
 - ii. Income also reflects depreciation.
 - h. Advantages to using Gross Book Value
 - i. Depreciation methods are arbitrary
 - ii. ROI will increase over time ceteris paribus if depreciation is included in its calculation.
 - i. There's no particular global rule defining what's best.
 - j. Use whatever is appropriate, and make sure everybody is aware of the choice and its implications.
- V. Transfer Pricing
 - a. When one division within a company sells to another, what price should it use?
 - b. Need a price that makes sense both with respect to each division, and with respect to the company as a whole.
 - c. Consider a transfer of parts from B to A
 - d. B's Books

i. DR Inter-company Receivables Due from A	110	
ii. CR Inter-company Receivables		110
iii. DR COGS	100	
iv. CR Inventory		100
 - e. A's Books

i. DR Inventory	110	
ii. CR Inter-company Payables		110
 - f. In the end, sales between divisions should become invisible from the outside.
 - i. Sales to the outside aren't a problem.
 - ii. Inter-company profit needs to be eliminated
 - iii. Elimination Entry

1. DR Sales Inter-Company	110	
2. CR COGS		100
3. CR Inventory		10
 - iv. Total sales needs to reflect any sales to the outside and inventory needs to reflect cost without markups.
 - g. What is the ideal transfer price?
 - i. Want to incentivize individual managers to do well with their department.
 - ii. Want departments to work together to boost performance of the whole company.
 - iii. No Excess Capacity
 - 1. Transfer Price = Outlay Cost = Opportunity Cost

2. Opportunity Cost is the contribution margin foregone by not selling to the outside.
3. So the transfer price gets set at the market price.
4. When in a short-term distressed market that may change a little.
- iv. Excess Capacity
 1. There's no opportunity cost if all capacity can't even be used.
 2. Transfer Price = Outlay Cost
- h. Establishing Transfer Prices
 - i. Not all companies are consistent and rational.
 - ii. Prices may be centrally established, and divisions then decide how to react.
 - iii. Can have both managers (buying and selling) negotiate together
 1. One manager may be a better negotiator.
 2. Want to build constraints into the incentive system to keep anybody from trying to hurt some other division.
- i. Cost-Based Transfer Pricing
 - i. Don't treat unit fixed costs as variable!
 - ii. Want to be using standard costs to keep managers from pushing their inefficiencies onto other departments
- j. International Perspective
 - i. Having divisions in many countries allows some fun games to be played.
 - ii. Want to increase revenues in low-tax countries
 - iii. Want to increase costs in high-tax countries
 - iv. Sell from low-tax to high-tax countries and get both benefits at once.